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I. Introduction
In 1975, the New Jersey Supreme Court made history with its semi-
nal and unprecedented declaration in Southern Burlington County
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,' ("Mount Laurel I"), that, as a
matter of state constitutional law, every developing municipality
within the State of New Jersey must ensure a realistic opportunity for
the construction of its fair share of the present and future regional
need for low and moderate-income housing.2 Eight years later, in re-
sponse to widespread municipal noncompliance and governmental in-
activity,3 the court endeavored in Mount Laurel III to aggressively
implement the constitutional obligation, prescribing an arsenal of
remedies and procedures aimed at providing a meaningful chance for
the construction of "decent housing for the poor. '5.
The court's bold and controversial challenge to exclusionary zoning
practices6 provided the coordinating governmental branches with a
compelling impetus to act, an impetus rooted at a minimum in a firm,
widely-held resolve to remove the judiciary from the business of land
use planning. This resolve yielded the Fair Housing Act ("Act"),7
signed into law in 1985. The Act's stated intent is to prescribe "a
comprehensive planning and implementation response" to the Mount
Laurel mandate, replacing the courts with an administrative agency
known as the Council on Affordable Housing ("COAH"). The
supreme court, mindful of its own long-expressed preference for a leg-
islative solution and pleased with the statute's expressed intent, enthu-
siastically endorsed the Act in Hills Development Co. v. Township of
Bernards,s ("Mount Laurel III").
COAH has been in operation for six years. As the need for housing
for those of low income and, indeed, for those of little or no income,
1. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975)
[hereinafter Mount Laurel 1].
2. Id. at 173-75, 336 A.2d at 724-25. The court derived this mandate from the state
constitutional requirements of substantive due process and equal protection, as well as
from the state's inherent police powers to regulate land use for the general welfare.
3. See Alan Mallach, From Mount Laurel to Molehill." Blueprint for Delay, N.J.
REP., Oct. 1985, at 21. ("Looking back in 1983, eight years after the original [Mount
Laurel] decision, it seemed clear that little lower-income housing had actually been built
as a result of the Mount Laurel ruling, and not a single unit in Mount Laurel Township
itself."); Sen. John A. Lynch, Mount Laurel Update, 9 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 575 (1986)
("The Mt. Laurel I decision was ignored by everyone.").
4. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456
A.2d 390 (1983) [hereinafter Mount Laurel II].
5. Id. at 352, 456 A.2d at 490.
6. See infra note 17.
7. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301 to -329 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991).
8. 103 N.J. 1, 510 A.2d 621 (1986) [hereinafter Mount Laurel III].
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continues to reach grave proportions, concerns about the Act and the
agency's operational effectiveness have assumed a greater urgency and
wider relevance. Indeed, the prodigious New Jersey experiment holds
lessons both for a nation in the throes of a crisis of homelessness and
displacement as well as for individual states grappling with the ills of
exclusionary zoning practices.
Much can, and should, be learned from the Mount Laurel model
and legacy. Ultimately, an agenda for inquiry and reform turns on
empirically-rooted responses to several questions. Among these are,
first, will the scheme now in place result in more housing?9 Second,
will that housing be affordable?'" Third, where will it be located?"
Established in 1990, the Affordable Housing Colloquium of the Se-
ton Hall University Center for Social Justice is engaged in active ef-
forts to address meaningfully these and other issues related to the
success or failure of present affordable housing models, and to search
for practical solutions to housing needs. The Colloquium has endeav-
ored to gather and interpret the conceptual antecedents and empirical
bases for assessing whether Mount Laurel, as implemented by the
New Jersey Fair Housing Act, is accomplishing its objectives.
Through extensive research and responsive discourse, the Colloquium
also aims to serve as a catalyst for thought and meaningful action,
intended to find and to help implement effective models for the provi-
sion of decent housing for all people.
The following presentation, the first in a series of exchanges to be
sponsored by the Colloquium, sets forth the historical and theoretical
underpinnings of the Mount Laurel doctrine, while exploring the via-
bility of existing mechanisms to implement the constitutional impera-
tive. Mr. Art Bernard,* the Deputy Executive Director of COAH,
9. Comprehensive empirical data on the dimensions and extent of municipal partici-
pation (or nonparticipation) remains a critical component of this inquiry. The Affordable
Housing Colloquium is presently collecting and interpreting relevant statistical data now
available from COAH.
10. The Mount Laurel trilogy was concerned with the provision of housing for those
of low and moderate income, so that, as one intended benefit, workers could afford to live
in the communities where they worked. The plight of those of no income - the desper-
ately poor, the unemployed, the homeless - was not taken up by the court. Similarly, in
determining eligibility for Mount Laurel housing, the statutory specifications rely on the
State's low and moderate-income standards, with "low income" defined as up to fifty per
cent of the county's median income, and "moderate income" as up to eighty per cent of
median income. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-304(c)-(d). These definitions are also set
forth by the court in Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 221, n.8 456 A.2d at 421.
11. Mount Laurel was aimed at eradicating exclusionary zoning practices, in an at-
tempt to end economic segregation in the State.
* Deputy Director, Council on Affordable Housing. M.A. in City and Regional
Planning, Rutgers University; B.A., Lafayette College. As Deputy Director of COAH,
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maintains that the plan now in place for realizing affordable housing
goals is workable and is, in fact, working. By contrast, Professor Pe-
ter Van Doren,* an economist at Yale University, argues that the
Mount Laurel strategy is fundamentally ill-conceived. Instead of at-
tempting to manipulate housing market outcomes, he suggests that
the various efficiency and equity problems in land use are better ad-
dressed by a system of wealth redistribution.
Mr. Bernard is responsible for developing the Council's policies and rules. To date, he
has mediated disputes related to over 4,000 housing units.
* Assistant Professor of Public Policy and Management, Yale School of Organiza-
tion and Management. Ph.D. in Political Science, Yale University; B.S., Massachusetts
Institute of Technology.
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II. Transcript of Proceedings
PROFESSOR PAULA A. FRANZESE: Welcome to this exciting
opportunity for us to place into some perspective the continuing im-
pact, drama, pressure and conflicts of the Mount Laurel legacy. To-
day we will explore with two leading experts, Mr. Art Bernard and
Professor Peter Van Doren, the nature of the renown mandate in the
State of New Jersey that every developing municipality must provide
the opportunity for affordable housing for those of low and moderate
income, at least to the extent of that municipality's fair share of the
regional need for such housing. 12
It is now 20 years since the original Mount Laurel suit was filed. Is
the imperative set into motion then still viable? Is it workable? Is it
working? Does it go too far, or perhaps not far enough, insofar as it
fails to make provision for those of no income - the ever-increasing
ranks of the homeless and the desperately poor, for whom any hous-
ing, let alone affordable housing, remains out of reach?
To address meaningfully these questions and others, it is helpful to
look back briefly at where we have been. To facilitate that endeavor, I
would like to provide a thumbnail sketch of the history of Mount
Laurel.
Mount Laurel is an appellation that applies not only to a place on
the New Jersey map, but also to a trilogy of cases that, taken together,
have been "ground-breaking," so to speak. Actually, as Chief Justice
Wilentz proclaimed in the second Mount Laurel ruling, writing for
the unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court, "We may not build
houses, but we do enforce the constitution." 13 It was back in 1975, in
Mount Laurel I, that the court determined that the state constitution
mandates that every developing municipality must provide for its fair
share of the regional housing need for those of low and moderate
income. 14
Mount Laurel I was a lawsuit brought in the early 1970's by law-
yers working for Camden Legal Services.15 It was directed against a
12. Mount Laurel 1, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423
U.S. 808 (1975).
13. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 352,
456 A.2d 390, 490 (1983).
14. Mount Laurel I, 67 N.J. at 173-75, 336 A.2d at 724-25.
15. The actual plaintiffs in the case fell into four categories: (1) present residents of
the township residing in dilapidated or substandard housing; (2) former residents who
were forced to move elsewhere because of the absence of suitable housing; (3) nonresi-
dents living in central city substandard housing in the region who desire to secure decent
housing and accompanying advantages within their means elsewhere; and (4) three orga-
nizations representing the housing and other interests of racial minorities. Id. at 159 n.3,
336 A.2d at 717.
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township, Mount Laurel, that was just entering a period of large-scale
development, with some scattered and dilapidated rural areas remain-
ing from an earlier development period. Faced with a rapid rate of
growth that could threaten its tax base and increase the demand for
public services, the Township reacted with a number of measures
designed to avoid those effects. It zoned nearly one-third of its land to
industrial uses - uses that would generate high tax revenues and re-
quire few services. The remaining land was devoted to single-family
detached dwellings in the conventional subdivision pattern - permit-
ting only houses of significant size and expense, affordable only to
those families of middle or higher incomes."
The challenge to this scheme was phrased largely in terms of racial
exclusion. Ultimately, and interestingly the New Jersey Supreme
Court transmuted the dispute into a case involving segregation along
economic lines, concluding that the Township's exclusionary zoning
practices 7 had the effect of excluding the poor. Mount Laurel had
made no provision for low-income housing. Indeed, it seemed hostile
to the idea. In the court's estimation, the Township's land use control
pattern resulted in economic discrimination, in a rather obvious and
transparent way. mI Mount Laurel's zoning regulations prevented the
construction of low-cost housing, thereby locking out those segments
of the community deemed undesirable: the poor, the elderly, and ra-
16. In a concurring opinion, Justice Pashman discussed the widespread use of "inher-
ently exclusionary zoning" devices such as setting minimum house size requirements, as
well as minimum requirements for lot size and frontage; prohibiting multi-family housing
and mobile homes; developing bedroom restrictions which limited the number of bed-
rooms which could be included in each dwelling unit; and overzoning for non-residential
uses such as industrial parks, office parks and manufacturing complexes. 67 N.J. at 197-
203, 336 A.2d at 737-40.
17. Exclusionary zoning may be defined as "local land use controls that have the
effect of excluding most low-income and many moderate-income households from subur-
ban communities and, indirectly, of excluding most members of minority groups .. "
DANIEL MANDELKER & ROGER CUNNINGHAM, PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND
DEVELOPMENT 304 (1985). By contrast, inclusionary zoning refers to any number of
techniques, such as mandatory set-asides or density bonuses, intended to compel or en-
courage the development of low-income housing. See Thomas Kleven, Inclusionary Ordi-
nances-Policy and Legal Issues in Requiring Private Developers to Build Low Cost
Housing, 21 UCLA L. REV. 1432 (1974).
18. The court's language on this point echoed the sentiments of the lower court:
Through its zoning ordinances, [Mt. Laurel] has exhibited economic discrimi-
nation in that the poor have been deprived of adequate housing and the oppor-
tunity to secure the construction of subsidized housing, and has used federal,
state, county and local finances and resources solely for the betterment of mid-
dle and upper-income persons.
67 N.J. at 170, 336 A.2d at 723 (quoting Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Twp.
of Mount Laurel, 119 N.J. Super. 164, 178).
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cial minorities. 19 One incongruous result of this scheme: it was im-
possible for many Township employees - the workers in Mount
Laurel's industrial zones - to actually live in the community where
they worked.
Mount Laurel I was written by Justice Hall as his farewell to the
bench. It is considered by many to be the most important zoning
opinion since the United States Supreme Court's celebrated pro-
nouncement in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company.2' The
decision established, without dissent, that every developing munici-
pality must act affirmatively to provide a realistic opportunity for the
location, within its borders, of its fair share of the regional need for
low and moderate-income housing.2 In accord with this mandate,
Mount Laurel was ordered to amend its zoning ordinances in order to
correct existing deficiencies. The Township was given the opportu-
nity to act without judicial supervision, but, the court warned, should
Mount Laurel fail to respond meaningfully, further judicial action
would be warranted.22
There was a problem with this order, however, since it was not
quite clear just what response was mandated by the court's pro-
nouncement.23 Particularly problematic was the decision's failure to
19. In addition to these groups, the court noted that single persons and large growing
families not in the poverty class, but who still could not afford to secure the kinds of
housing realistically permitted, were also victims of Mount Laurel's zoning practices. Id.
at 159, 336 A.2d at 717.
20. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). In this case, an owner of unimproved land brought suit
against the village where the land was located in an attempt to enjoin the enforcement of
a restrictive zoning ordinance. The ordinance in question sought to impose zoning regu-
lations which would have separated the village into industrial and residential sectors.
The landowner argued that the ordinance reduced the value of his property and
amounted to an unfair deprivation of liberty and property without due process of law. In
upholding the ordinance, the Supreme Court reasoned that it had been adopted for a
valid purpose and that the legislative judgment of the ordinance was controlling, even if
the landowner suffered a constitutional injury.
21. Mount Laurel I, 67 N.J. at 173-75, 336 A.2d at 724-25. The court derived this
mandate from the state constitutional requirements of substantive due process and equal
protection, invoking as well the state's inherent police powers to regulate land use for the
general welfare. Id.
22. Id. at 192, 336 A.2d at 734. The court declined to prescribe remedies to effectuate
its mandate, reasoning that:
It is not appropriate at this time, particularly in view of the advanced view of
zoning law as applied to housing laid down by this opinion, to deal with the
matter of the further extent of judicial power in the field or to exercise any
further power .... The municipality should first have full opportunity to itself
act without judicial supervision.
Id.
23. By contrast, the lower court's order was more specific, requiring Mount Laurel to
undertake studies analyzing factors related to the housing needs of the Township's low
and moderate-income residents; estimate the number of units required to meet this need;
1991]
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define the component parts of its new edict. For example, what is a
"developing municipality"? When is housing "affordable"? How
would the "regional need" for such housing be ascertained? How
would a qualifying municipality's "fair share" of that need be calcu-
lated?24 The gaps that lingered are reminiscent of an old tale, which
offers a less than flattering portrayal of our profession and the legal
method. Two people were up in a balloon, and they were lost. They
spotted someone on the ground and yelled, "Hello, where are we?"
The person yelled back, "You're up in a balloon." One balloonist
then said to the other, "That person below is a lawyer." "How do
you know?," asked the bewildered companion. The balloonist re-
plied, "He spoke with confidence, he answered dispositively, and what
he said was totally useless." Hours later, the still airborne duo spot-
ted another person on the ground. "Excuse me, but where are we?
Please help us," they yelled. This time, the person below went on, for
an hour and a half, in response. The balloonist then said to her
friend, "That person is a supreme court judge." "How do you
know?," asked the friend. "Well," came the reply, "He told us more
than we wanted to know about where we've been, he outlined all of
the places where we could have landed safely, but he hasn't given us a
hint on how to get to any of them."
Perhaps because of the definitional gaps in the court's pronounce-
ment, and surely no doubt as a consequence of municipal resistance to
the very heart of the mandate, Mount Laurel I generated little more
than studied inaction. 25 In 1983, the court's first decision was vigor-
ously reaffirmed in Mount Laurel JJ,26 a unanimous opinion that was
two and one-half years in the making. Angered and frustrated by the
lack of progress in the development of adequate housing for people of
low and moderate means, 27 the court, led by Chief Justice Wilentz,
asserted that it had no choice but to act more aggressively to compel
and develop an implementation plan in accordance with the results of the study. Further,
Mount Laurel was told to comply with the court's order within 90 days. Southern Bur-
lington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 119 N.J. Super. 164, 178-79 (1972).
24. It has been suggested that the Mount Laurel I court's failure to define the consti-
tutional mandate "slowed voluntary compliance by municipalities because the municipal-
ities remained uncertain as to what their obligations entailed." G. Alan Tarr & Russell S.
Harrison, Legitimacy and Capacity in State Supreme Court Policymaking: The New Jersey
Court and Exclusionary Zoning, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 513, 519 (1984).
25. See supra note 3.
26. 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983).
27. The court's displeasure is reflected, for example, in its observation that:
After all this time, ten years after the trial court's initial order invalidating its
zoning ordinance, Mount Laurel remains afflicted with a blatantly exclusionary
ordinance. Papered over with studies, rationalized by hired experts, the ordi-
nance at its core is true to nothing but Mount Laurel's determination to exclude
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municipal compliance.2"
The court's decision in Mount Laurel II is profoundly significant in
a number of ways. First, it states specifically that a municipality's
planning and zoning powers must not be used to favor rich over
poor.29 The decision also represents a policy of judicial activism, sug-
gesting that when the Legislature fails to vindicate a major constitu-
tional right, it is incumbent upon the judiciary to step in to enforce
that right.30
To put "muscle" and "steel" into its mandate, the court in Mount
Laurel II prescribed a veritable arsenal of measures, including the
controversial "builder's remedy," a form of redress which gave
builder-plaintiffs an incentive to challenge. exclusionary zoning ordi-
nances. 31 The builder who waged a successful Mount Laurel suit and
proposed a development that would provide for some lower and mod-
erate-income housing would be granted a court order permitting him
or her to proceed with that development, notwithstanding the objec-
tions of the targeted municipality's zoning board.32 Future Mount
Laurel litigation would be handled by three designated judges
charged with responsibility for determining "fair share" for their as-
signed region, evaluating the merits of challenges to a qualifying mu-
nicipality's zoning scheme, and overseeing the process of
promulgating and enforcing conditions to guide and control
development.33
Throughout, the supreme court acknowledged that its prescription
for achieving the Mount Laurel obligation resembled "traditional ex-
ecutive or legislative models."' 34 Mindful of the inherent limitations
of judicial intervention, the court emphatically stated its preference
for legislative over judicial action. Recognizing that the sore absence
of political consensus posed a formidable obstacle to the passage of
responsive legislation, the court concluded that enforcement of the
constitutional rights at stake could not await a supporting popular
the poor. Mount Laurel is not alone: we believe that there is widespread com-
pliance with the constitutional mandate of our original opinion in this case.
Id. at 198-99, 456 A.2d at 410.
28. Id. at 200, 456 A.2d at 410.
29. Id. at 209, 456 A.2d at 415.
30. See Paula A. Franzese, Mount Laurel III. The New Jersey Supreme Court's Judi-
cious Retreat, 18 SETON HALL L. REV. 30, 46-54 (1988) (exploring the Mount Laurel
trilogy as illustrative of the separateness as well as the interdependence of the governmen-
tal powers).
31. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 278-81, 456 A.2d at 452-53.
32. Id. at 279-80, 456 A.2d at 453.
33. Id. at 253-54, 456 A.2d at 439.
34. Id. at 287, 456 A.2d at 465.
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concordance.3
The supreme court's zealous initiative in Mount Laurel II gener-
ated impassioned dissent as well as vigorous praise.36 It was lauded
by some as an example of bold and brave humanitarianism, daring to
assume that basic democratic values could be upheld and vindi-
cated.37 Conversely, it was denounced by others as an anti-demo-
cratic usurpation of home rule,38 or as an idealistic but inherently.
unworkable and arbitrary attempt at manipulation of the free market.
Although it did not inspire consensus on the merits, Mount Laurel
II did yield at least one accord. It motivated a firm resolve to get the
courts out of the business of land use planning and implementation.
In 1985, the coordinating branches of government did just that, with
the passage of the Fair Housing Act. 39 This statute represents the
State's first comprehensive legislative response to New Jersey's hous-
ing and planning needs, and has been described as "a compromise
between radical idealism and reactionary preservationism. '" As
such, it is a source of excitement as well as frustration. The Act cre-
ated an administrative agency, the Council, on Affordable Housing
("COAH"), with the power to define the regional need for affordable
housing, to promulgate criteria and guidelines to enable municipali-
ties to determine their fair share of that need, and to approve or disap-
prove proposed municipal plans to satisfy that need.41
The Fair Housing Act has been met with criticism and challenge.
It relies on voluntary municipal compliance,42 and fails to arm COAH
35. Id. at 212, 456 A.2d at 417. In this and in other respects, the court's bold initia-
tive is analogous to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
36. See John M. Payne, Rethinking Fair Share: The Judicial Enforcement of Afforda-
ble Housing Policies, 16 REAL EST. L.J. 20, 22 (1987) ("It is difficult to convey adequately
the intensity of the public reaction to the Mount Laurel process since 1983. Where
Mount Laurel I could be ignored because it was ineffective, Mount Laurel II worked and
it stirred up a firestorm.")
37. See, e.g., David J. Frizell, Mount Laurel and Sound Planning, N.J.L.J., Oct. 13,
1983, at 414-15 (heralding Mount Laurel as "a giant step forward" that "will result in a
substantial and sustained improvement in land use planning in New Jersey").
38. See Second Annual Message of Governor Thomas H. Kean to the New Jersey
Legislature (Jan. 10, 1984), reprinted in N.J. LEGIS. MAN. 486, 498 (1984) (attacking
Mount Laurel II as representing "an undesirable intrusion on the home rule principle.")
39. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27d-301 to -329.
40. Josh Goldfein, The Legacy of Mount Laurel, N.J. REP., Nov. 1988, at 21.
41. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-307.
42. Pursuant to the statutory scheme, a municipality "which so elects" may adopt a
"resolution of participation." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-309(a). A "resolution of partic-
ipation" is defined as "a resolution adopted by a municipality in which the municipality
chooses to prepare a fair share plan and housing element in accordance with this act."
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-304(e).
[Vol. XIX
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with mechanisms to compel meaningful response. The Act also cre-
ates the regional contribution agreement ("RCA"), which permits
suburbs to pay cities for agreeing to absorb up to one-half of the sub-
urb's assessed Mount Laurel obligation.43 The notion that wealthier
municipalities can "buy-out" part of their Mount Laurel responsibil-
ity, coupled with other concerns as to the statute's efficacy, prompted
constitutional challenges which were taken up by the supreme court
in Mount Laurel HLI.'
This third decision in the Mount Laurel series resoundingly en-
dorses the legislative response.45 Deferring to the statute and provid-
ing it the benefit of the presumption of constitutionality,46 the court
yielded the floor to the Legislature, noting that "no one wants his or
her neighborhood determined by judges."47 The court did, however,
conclude its hopeful demonstration of comity with an admonition of
43. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-312. This provision of the Act reads: "A municipal-
ity may propose the transfer of up to 50% of its fair share to another municipality within
its housing region by means of a contractual agreement into which two municipalities
voluntarily enter." However, checks are placed on RCAs to assure fair compliance with
the statute. These checks require review and approval by the county planning board, as
well as a determination as to whether the agreement provides a realistic opportunity for
the provision of low and moderate income housing with convenient access to employment
opportunities. Id.
44. Hills Development Co. v. Twp. of Bernards, 103 N.J. 1, 510 A.2d 621 (1986).
45. Mindful of its own long-expressed preference for a legislative solution, as well as
the statute's stated intent to satisfy the constitutional obligation, the court wholeheart-
edly validated the Fair Housing Act:
The Act that we review and sustain today represents a substantial effort by the
other branches to vindicate the Mount Laurel constitutional obligation .... If
the Act before us works in accordance with its expressed intent, it will assure a
realistic opportunity for lower income housing in all those parts of the state
where sensible planning calls for such housing.
Mount Laurel III, 103 N.J. at 21, 510 A.2d at 632.
46. The court hastened to reject contentions that the statutory scheme, as imple-
mented, would provide little more than a superficial palliative:
Most objections raised against the Act assume that it will not work, or construe
its provisions so that it cannot work, and attribute both to the legislation and to
the Council a mission, nowhere expressed in the Act, of sabotaging the Mount
Laurel doctrine. On the contrary, we must assume that the Council will pursue
the vindication of the Mount Laurel obligation with determination and skill. If
it does, that vindication should be far preferable to vindication by the courts,
and may be far more effective.
103 N.J. at 21, 510 A.2d at 632.
47. Id. The deference which characterizes Mount Laurel III tacitly recognizes that
even the most resolute judicial participation in the vindication of constitutional rights
should exist in the form of a continuous and fluid colloquy with the legislature and the
executive, administrative agencies and the public. Yielding to the coordinating branches'
efforts, the court's abdication of a policy-making role seemed guided in part by a respon-
siveness to the possibility, if not the likelihood, that in assuming such a role it had ex-
ceeded the range of political tolerance.
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sorts: "Our deference today in no way signals a weakening of our
resolve to enforce the constitutional rights of New Jersey's lower-in-
come citizens. The constitutional obligation has not changed. '48
What, then, has changed in the six years since COAH has been in
operation? The State has estimated that, for the years 1987 to 1993,
there is a statewide need for approximately 146,000 housing units for
the Mount Laurel-eligible population. 9 How many units have been
built thus far, and where? For that matter, who is the "Mount Lau-
rel-eligible population"? How has the Council defined "low income"
and "moderate income"? Where does that leave those families and
individuals of no income? How viable an agency is COAH itself?.
Where has it been and where is it headed? In the face of municipal
resistance and gloomy economic forecasts, can we expect voluntary
and meaningful realization of the Mount Laurel mandate, or is the
judiciary destined to re-enter the fray in an attempt to force compli-
ance? Is the very notion of forced compliance an oxymoron of sorts,
with the court's refrain in Mount Laurel II haunting us still: "We
cannot build houses, but we can enforce the constitution?"
To address these questions and others, we are pleased to have with
us today Mr. Art Bernard and Professor Peter Van Doren. Mr. Ber-
nard, the Deputy Executive Director of the Council on Affordable
Housing, has been with the agency since its inception. He is a li-
censed professional planner, responsible for most of COAH's policy
development. Mr. Bernard maintains that the Mount Laurel mandate
and the plan now in place for realizing affordable housing goals are
not only workable - they're working.
Professor Van Doren is a former Assistant Professor of Politics and
Public Affairs at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School and
is currently teaching at the Yale School of Organization and Manage-
ment. He has argued that the Mount Laurel strategy is fundamentally
ill-conceived, and not likely to accomplish its worthy objectives, in-
cluding the provision of better housing for low-income persons.
Ladies and gentlemen, may I present to you Mr. Art Bernard.
MR. ART BERNARD: I want to thank you for inviting me to this
first conference. Where do I start? I think it's fair to say that the
Council on Affordable Housing was born out of the supreme court's
two Mount Laurel decisions, and let me just backtrack to the second
one for a bit, because the first decision did leave an ambiguity, as
Paula [Franzese] said, about the constitutional obligation of every de-
48. Id.
49. See Goldfein, supra note 40.
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veloping community. The second Mount Laurel decision went a step
further and clarified that every community has this constitutional ob-
ligation to provide its fair share of a regional low and moderate-in-
come housing need. So all of us share in this obligation. For those of
you who aren't familiar with the definitions of "low" and "moderate"
incomes, low-income people are those who earn less than 50 percent
of the region's median income. Moderate-income people are those
who earn anywhere from 50 to 80 percent of the region's median
income.5o
As Paula [Franzese] said, an integral part of the second Mount
Laurel decision was this concept of a builder's remedy,"1 where there
was an incentive for builder-plaintiffs to initiate litigation. As com-
munity after community found itself dragged into court and saw its
zoning powers usurped, there was enough pressure in the legislature
to pass the Fair Housing Act in 1985.
In addition to establishing the Council, one of the important things
that the Act does is to require every community to formulate a plan to
meet its low and moderate-income housing obligation. 2 They have to
adopt a housing element5 3 if they're going to keep the presumptive
validity of their zoning ordinances, and this housing element must be
part of their master plan. It's part of the plan for the community.
In establishing the Council, the Legislature gave the Council some
very specific direction. For instance, it told the Council to establish
housing regions throughout the State. It told the Council to quantify
the need for housing in each of these housing regions and then to
come up with a way to distribute that need to each municipality
within that region. And then, perhaps most importantly, it told the
Council to establish criteria that parties could rely on in developing a
housing element and in reviewing a housing element.5 ' The process
that the Legislature set up is essentially voluntary. 5
Communities, once they complete this housing element and adopt
it, can file it with the Council, but they don't even have to do that. If
they do not file it with the Council and they are subsequently sued,
50. See supra note 10.
51. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
52. See N.J. STAT. ANN. 52:27D-309. Prior to the passage of the Fair Housing Act,
local planning and land use in New Jersey was regulated by the Municipal Land Use
Law, 1975 N.J. LAWS 291.
53. A "housing element" is that portion of a municipality's master plan designed to
achieve the goal of access to affordable housing to meet present and prospective housing
needs, with particular attention to low and moderate income housing. See N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 52:27D-310.
54. These directives are set forth in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-307.
55. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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the municipality would remain in court and the community would be
subject to this builder's remedy that everyone had been so upset
about.
A community that files a housing element with the Council now
has two years after that filing to petition for certification or to ask the
Council to review the element and approve it. If the given municipal-
ity does not petition within that two-year period, then, again, it is
probably subject to a builder's remedy, vulnerable to a lawsuit.
So the cases that come before the Council are presented by those
communities that voluntarily take advantage of the opportunity to
plan and do a housing element. The communities that take advantage
of the opportunity to file a housing element with the Council are also,
for the most part, those communities which petition the Council for
certification within a two-year period of time. Now, this two-year
limit is relatively new. It was a legislative change last year. 6
In coming up with this housing element, communities have a fair
amount of flexibility. If they have substandard housing in town, well,
they can rehabilitate it. They can choose to zone and to let the private
sector build all of the housing for them. They can choose to create a
process in which the community itself, perhaps through a nonprofit
organization, can build the required housing.
They [the communities] can even, under the Fair Housing Act, take
advantage of the regional contribution agreement ("RCA") and enter
into an agreement with another community to accept up to 50 percent
of their obligation." With a RCA, there are sending communities
and receiving communities. There is cash that usually changes hands
between the sender and the receiver. The sender is usually a suburban
community. The receiver is usually an urban center.
Once the Council gets a case, either through a petition for certifica-
tion or a lawsuit within this two-year framework I was talking about,
a clock begins and there is a 45-day period in which the staff reviews
the housing element and anyone else can review it.5 8 Anyone in this
room could review the housing element, and if he or she had a prob-
lem with it, register an objection with the Council.59 Having done so,
the Fair Housing Act mandates that the Council sit down in a media-
tion session and try to negotiate an end to the dispute between the
municipality and the objectors to the planY° I think that one of the
56. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-313 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991).
57. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
58. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, §§ 91-1-14.6 (Supp. 1991).
59. Id.
60. Id.
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more innovative things that the Fair Housing Act did was to create
this alternative for dispute resolution. Still, the parties are told as
mediation begins that there's a limited amount of time to resolve their
disputes and that if they can't resolve their problems in this limited
amount of time, that the case may be sent to an administrative law
judge for fact-finding. Moreover, the parties are told that whether the
matter goes to this judge or not, the Council is going to make deci-
sions for them. Given that dynamic, we've found that parties are will-
ing to talk and that mediation is an effective means of dispute
resolution.
Now, for some summary graphics.6 This map, for those of you
who don't recognize it, is New Jersey. The hot markets in New Jersey
are the areas that have the infrastructure to support the growth, that
have the traffic networks and the access to markets, that have the land
necessary to address growth. Most of these communities in New
Jersey have somehow remained unaffected by the Mount Laurel
decision.
There is planning going on. There is zoning in place for housing to
be built and in some cases, the communities are building the housing
themselves. You can see that in the Pinelands, where we have envi-
ronmental constraints that preclude higher densities, there isn't much
activity. In the northwest part of the State, where we have a lack of
infrastructure, and in the northeast where there is a lack of land,
there's been a lack of litigation or petitions for certification.
Regarding activity before the courts and before my organization,
[the Council], about 70 cases, I would guess, have probably settled in
court, and the 70 cases that are before the courts we estimate have
produced plans for over 25,000 units. We have certified probably one
hundred and thirty communities at this point for. close to 17,000
units, so that there are real plans to build and rehabilitate approxi-
mately 42,000 units right now.
I think it is fair to say that much of the activity depicted on this
map was driven by the private sector and its desire for profit under
the Mount Laurel edict of the builder's remedy. I think it's also fair
to say that much of this took years to settle and cost millions of dol-
lars between parties in trying to reap some sort of settlement that the
municipality, the developers, and the housing advocacy groups could
accept.
Now, where are we going? Right now the Council is going through
61. The graphics presented at the Colloquium included a table and map summarizing
Mount Laurel housing activity. The information contained therein was compiled by
COAH and is available at COAH's office in Lawrenceville, N.J.
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a comprehensive review of its rules and the reality we are facing is
somewhat different from the reality of 1983. For one thing, the mar-
ket is different. In 1983, the market for townhouse and condominium
units was plentiful; in 1991, that market has dried up and shifted
more towards single-family units. This makes it necessary for our
rules to adjust to the changing market.
I think we know that developers and municipalities have become
more adept at negotiating deals that avoid litigation, but do not bene-
fit the poor. We know that the Public Advocate's Office has been cut
back and they have been a major player in this [the implementation of
Mount Laurel's inclusionary zoning edict].62 Because of this, it ap-
pears that litigation will be a less effective mechanism for implement-
ing the Mount Laurel obligation. This means we have to come up
with a way to encourage communities to plan and come forth volun-
tarily rather than waiting for the private sector to sue.
PROFESSOR FRANZESE: In response, I am delighted that we
have Professor Van Doren with us to present some of his arguments
and also some of his larger economic concerns.
PROFESSOR PETER VAN DOREN: It is not my intention today
to be the bad bearer of economic reasoning and reinforce the stereo-
type that lawyers and sociologists favor progressive social change
while economists favor the status quo. Rather, my goal today is to
impress upon you that housing is bought and sold in markets just like
cars, energy, and toothpaste, and that housing market outcomes can
be successfully altered without causing other problems only if policies
are designed with economic insights in mind.6 a
Normally, we teach students that a system of property rights and
prices signals to firms and consumers the proper information about an
efficient allocation of goods and services in markets. Under some con-
ditions, however, private markets do not efficiently provide commodi-
ties. In these situations, which are called market failures, markets
over-provide or under-provide commodities compared to the efficient
level.' 4
Private markets under-supply public goods because consumption
cannot be restricted to those who pay. Entrepreneurs who tried to
make a living by privately supplying goods would go out of business.
62. See infra note 75.
63. See Mark A. Hughes & Peter Van Doren, Social Policy through Land Reform:
New Jersey's Mount Laurel Controversy, 105 POL. ScI. Q. 97 (1990).
64. See EDWARD J. MISHAN, WHAT POLITICAL ECONOMY IS ALL ABOUT 119-63
(1982).
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Private markets over-supply commodities in situations in which prop-
erty rights do not exist for all the inputs that are used in the produc-
tion of that commodity. The lack of property rights for air and water,
for example, leads to overuse of these resources and environmental
pollution.
Now, public policy, of course, can remedy both positive and nega-
tive market failures. Governments, if they read Paul Samuelson's
1954 article,65 can supply an optimal amount of public goods, and if
they read Ronald Coase's 1960 article, 66 can solve negative externali-
ties by creating property rights for harms and allowing them to be
bought and sold.
Now, what does this have to do with land markets and housing
markets? Private unregulated land markets exhibit negative market
failures because people can be negatively affected by land uses that are
nearby spatially without their consent. For example, in completely
free land markets, scrap yards and beef tallow plants - my two fa-
vorite examples - can locate next door without consent.
Now, there's a trickier kind of externality in housing markets with-
out zoning, once we introduce the property tax to raise revenue.67
The property tax creates incentives to consume local services, but not
to own much property and land wealth so that one can consume these
public services and not pay much for them. Public policy can correct
both of these kinds of market failures through the creation of land-use
rights, what we usually call zoning, but whenever we create property
rights, we face a non-economic decision about whom to allocate these
rights to before we start the market in question.
In petroleum offshore drilling rights, for example, the government
does not give away these rights. Rather, it auctions them off. It cre-
ates the property rights to drill the oil, but it does not give these away
for free. Again, it auctions them off. For those of you who know
something about telecommunications, when the property rights in ra-
dio broadcasting were created, they were just given away for free to
early broadcasters in the 1920's. So across the series of examples
where we've had to create property rights from scratch, we have both
sold and given them away.
Now, states, in effect, have allowed localities to create collective
65. Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 386 (1954).
66. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960).
67. See generally Peter Miezkowski & George Zodrow, Taxation and the Tiebout
Model: The Differential Effects of Head Taxes, Taxes on Land Rents, and Property
Taxes, 27 J. ECON. LIT. 1098 (1989).
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zoning rights without having to pay for them. Alternatively, states
could give outsiders, that is non-incumbent residents, these zoning
rights and force communities to have to pay outsiders not to come in.
This practice differs from the current situation in which outsiders
have to pay the incumbent residents to be permitted to enter.
Both of these solutions - these allocations of property rights -
solve the efficiency problem, that is, the lack of the market for harms
in land use, but they have very different equity implications. The for-
mer describes the system in New Jersey from 1920 through 1975
which, in effect, gave zoning rights to suburban residents without
charge. Mount Laurel simply switches those property rights and
gives them, in effect, to outsiders and forces incumbent residents to
bribe outsiders not to come into their community.
Now, an additional complication in zoning exists because if you
give property rights to those who already have wealth and the de-
mand for the commodity is "wealth elastic,"68 the equilibrium
amount of the commodity will be larger than in the situation where
the initial property rights had to be purchased. So the particular way
that we gave property rights to suburbs for free not only had equity
consequences, it also increased the amount of zoning restrictiveness
that we observe. We probably have a higher rate of zoning restric-
tions in suburbs because they've not had to pay for those property
rights, and by giving them for free, it in fact raised their demand for
this "wealth elastic" good above what it would have been if we had
given them to outsiders in the first place. Now, Mount Laurel, in
effect, redistributes property rights to the less advantaged much like
land reform in El Salvador redistributes to peasants with very little
wealth.69
What benefits do Mount Laurel supporters believe will result from
this redistribution? One, better housing; two, better educational op-
portunities for some poor children; three, an improved employee/em-
ployer spatial match because there are jobs in the suburbs but no
housing that can be afforded by workers. There may be some gains to
trade if people with less income could be in the suburbs and closer to
jobs. Fourth, Mount Laurel hopes to create spatial socioeconomic in-
tegration. If low-income citizens were in greater proximity to upper-
income citizens, they would soak up culture and values that would
allow them to better succeed in our economic systems.
68. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS 104-24 (1985).
69. The land redistribution which is being sought via the Central American and Mex-
ican Revolutions is somewhat analogous to the land distribution efforts resulting from the
Mount Laurel scheme.
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Now, what's the evidence about the ability of Mount Laurel to do
any of these things? Well, first, let's take better housing. Analytically,
we could separate getting better housing for people from relocating
people spatially. You could just give money. You could just give
wealth redistribution to poor people and allow them to locate wher-
ever they wish and they might very well end up in cities where they
are now, but they would have much more high-quality housing. Simi-
larly, we could spatially relocate poor people and do nothing about
their housing quality. We could have tenements located everywhere
spatially without doing anything about housing quality.
Mount Laurel is trying to do both those things at the same time.
It's trying to redistribute incomes across space and it's trying to
change housing quality at the same time. The reluctance of local ju-
risdictions to tax themselves to raise housing quality - after all, the
only way to raise housing quality is to tax some and give it to other
folks - led them to rely on the builder's remedy. What the builder's
remedy taxes is rents, it taxes the excess profits in a housing boom
that arise because the supply of market rate housing is less than de-
mand so the price rises above cost. The builder's remedy taxes some
of the rents and uses them to build low and moderate-income housing.
Once the housing boom ends, there are no rents and without rents,
you're not going to get any developer to be willing to build Mount
Laurel units in return for building market rate housing.
As to providing better educational opportunities for some poor
children, well, if you look at the educational econometric literature,70
quite frankly we don't know what really matters in terms of educa-
tion. Economists have regressed every input known to mankind on
the right-hand side where the left-hand side of an equation is school
performance and the coefficients always come up zero. No input that
school boards seem to control seems to have a definitive impact on
school performance. So it's not clear to me that socioeconomic mix-
ing per se will increase school performance.
As for the employer/employee spatial mismatch, we probably
could move workers to jobs from cities to suburbs using van pools and
that's a whole lot cheaper than building houses. We probably could
move a lot more workers to jobs. Secondly, the evidence shows that
black workers in particular suffer much more from racial discrimina-
tion in the labor market per se than from location disadvantages. 7' So
if we really have scarce resources and want to use them efficiently, we
70. See, e.g., Eric Hanushek, The Economics of Schooling, 24 J. ECON. LIT. 1141
(1986).
71. See Mark A. Hughes & Janice F. Madden, Residential Segregation and the Eco-
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should put our enforcement tools into ending labor market segrega-
tion as opposed to using that marginal public dollar for housing
programs.
To conclude, there's one final aspect that I want to talk about,
which is this very difficult-to-get-across concept that economists traf-
fic in, so called "deadweight loss."72 You see, when we point to new
housing units that are built in response to Mount Laurel - and I'm
not criticizing Mr. Bernard at all because this is his job to do this -
what you see is not necessarily what you get, because there's been a
response in the private housing market that isn't charted here. The
private suppliers of low-income housing take into account the fact
that they now have a competitor, known as the state, that is supplying
this housing.
I'm not going to argue that there's been no net change in the
number of low-income units because I don't think that's absolutely
correct. Still, the net increase in low-income units is actually less than
the number of new units that have been built, because these new units
compete with the private supply, what housing analysts call "filter-
ing."73 It's very difficult to get across the concepts of deadweight loss
and filtering in this kind of format, which is why economists always
come out looking very bad in these things and I'll end on that note.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR FRANZESE: The members of the Law School's
Colloquium on Affordable Housing74 are present today, and have
been involved in a host of fact-finding and law-finding efforts in order
to begin asking the right questions. The first in our series of queries
will be presented by Professor Angela Carmella.
PROFESSOR ANGELA CARMELLA: My question is for Mr.
Bernard. It relates to two groups of people that I'm thinking of; spe-
cifically, those with household incomes below 40 percent of median
income and the homeless. These obviously comprise a desperately
poor segment of our society in desperate need of housing. First, are
these groups of people factored into the determination of regional
nomic Status of Black Workers: New Evidence for an Old Debate, Working Paper in
Regional Science, University of Pennsylvania, 1987.
72. See HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 253-89 (1984).
73. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of Inclusionary Zoning in RESOLVING THE
HOUSING CRISIS 135-87 (M. Bruce Johnson, ed., 1982).
74. The Colloquium is comprised of an interdisciplinary group of Seton Hall faculty,
clinicians, practitioners, students, and community activists, all of whom possess some
expertise in the area of affordable housing. It is chaired by Professor Bernard Freamon of
Seton Hall Law School.
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need for housing, and secondly, is Mount Laurel at all responsive to
these particular groups? If so, in what way, and if not, are there plans
for the development of strategies for addressing the specific needs of
the homeless and the very, very poor? Thank you.
MR. BERNARD: Well, the decision and the Fair Housing Act
make no distinction about people making various incomes. As a mat-
ter of practice in setting up our program, we have established the
price of sales of housing ranging in affordability to people of 40 per-
cent of median income to 80 percent of median income. That was
done to face the realities of homeownership and qualifying for a
mortgage.
In addition, we have tried to create some rental opportunities and
we might talk about those later. We've also attempted to encourage
some alternative living arrangements for people who are very poor,
and there is at least one example in Perth Amboy where we were
successful in doing that. People with incomes of, I think, $6,000 per
year have found housing that way. With all that, we nonetheless have
not been very successful in creating housing opportunities for those
with less than 40 percent of median income.
Now, your question about the homeless. Last time the Council did
not include the homeless in its estimate of the housing need. The
inclusion of those presently living in sub-standard housing, as well as
future projections for lower-income people, however, was consistent
with the direction provided by the supreme court. As for the home-
less, the Council is currently reviewing its methodology and consider-
ing whether to include this portion of the population in the future, so
at the present time it remains undetermined.
PROFESSOR BERNARD FREAMON: Mr. Bernard, I also have a
question. As Professor Franzese mentioned, one of the engines be-
hind the initial Mount Laurel litigation had to do with segregated
housing patterns, housing patterns in New Jersey determined primar-
ily on the basis of race.
Isn't it true that the regional contribution agreements you referred
to - and perhaps you can explain a little more about what they are
- isn't it true that those agreements, where a suburban town can
"sell off," so to speak, its fair share obligation to an urban town, tend
to continue rather than break down those segregated housing pat-
terns? Also, the suburban towns tend to have preferences, so that
senior citizen housing and those kinds of units that are built as part of
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the fair share obligation, also continue to segregate housing.7
MR. BERNARD: To the extent that residential preferences and
RCAs create less housing for households made up of individuals who
do not live or work in a particular community, I suppose there is less
integration in the suburbs. However, the Legislature enacted RCAs
to allow communities to transfer fifty percent of their obligation,
probably because there were benefits in such transfers. In fact, at this
point RCAs have resulted in a contribution-of over 62 million dollars
into New Jersey's cities to create over 3,000 affordable units.
With regard to residential preferences, our data suggests that few
communities can fill half of their units with existing residents. This
means they must market the majority of their units elsewhere in the
housing region.
MR. CHRIS SANTORA: Mr. Van Doren, Mount Laurel legisla-
tion is a definite step to providing housing for people of all economic
levels. Absent government intervention, either through Mount Laurel
legislation or inclusionary zoning practices, will the market provide
affordable housing?
PROFESSOR VAN DOREN: Well, I grew up in northern New
York, near Watertown, for those of you who know upstate. In rural
areas, the market supplies very bad housing because there's no zon-
ing, so people don't fuss as much about what's next door to them
because there aren't very many affluent people who care. So the mo-
bile home - the mobile home, both new and deteriorated, used mo-
bile homes, and shacks - is, in fact, a private market supply of low-
income housing. It's not very good. Actually, my family lived in a
trailer from 1969 to 1973, so I have some acquaintance with this. It
leaked in the winter. The wind used to go though it and you couldn't
75. In fact, the Public Advocate has recently challenged several certifications issued
by COAH as unconstitutional under the Mount Laurel doctrine for these very reasons.
See, e.g., In re Petition for Substantive Certification filed by the Borough of Roseland, 247
N.J. Super. 203, 588 A.2d 1256 (1991); In re Petition for Substantive Certification filed by
the Twp. of Warren, 247 N.J. Super. 146, 588 A.2d 1227 (1991); In re Petition for Sub-
stantive Certification filed by the Twp. of Denville, 247 N.J. Super. 186, 588 A.2d 1248
(1991). As this article goes to press, there are a series of proceedings pending before the
New Jersey Supreme Court - an appeal by the Borough of Bloomingdale and a petition
for certification by the Township of Tewksbury - which many believe will result in
"Mount Laurel IV." The issues in these cases focus on (1) whether COAH is applying
the correct constitutional standard under Mount Laurel when making determinations
regarding certification; and (2) whether COAH is unlawfully approving plans that are
racially exclusive.
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heat it, but it is a private market response to low-income housing
needs.
The problems with poor people have nothing to do with housing
markets. Housing markets, in my view, work fine. Land markets
don't, but housing markets work fine. They're competitive, et cetera,
et cetera. As far as the supply of structures and the supply of capital,
there's no problem. The problem is that poor people don't have much
money, so if you care about housing market outcomes, my advice to
you is not to worry so much about housing markets and to redistrib-
ute wealth to the poor people.
PROFESSOR TRACY KAYE: Mr. Bernard, what does COAH
know about the gap between the number of units that have been ap-
proved versus built under its jurisdiction? Are there fiscal impedi-
ments that are causing this gap? Moreover, does the Fair Housing
Act and COAH's mandate encourage any sort of coordination of ef-
forts with federal programs such as low-income housing tax credits?
MR. BERNARD: I'm not sure that the legislation encourages
linkage with any federal program. There's a direct linkage by statute
to at least one State funding program.76 As a matter of practice,
many of the developers who are working on building rental housing
have worked with the NJHMFA [New Jersey Housing Mortgage Fi-
nance Agency], which serves as the broker of tax credits to create the
housing. I guess the most prominent example of the place where
that's being done is in Bernards Township.
I have read an article that talked about, I think, approvals for
something like 25,000 low and moderate-income units.77 Now, when
will they be built? Well, I think that's a function of the economy. In
other words, when people start building again these units will eventu-
ally be built.
However, there are impediments towards getting the units built,
such as the softening of the condominium market and the delay in
getting approvals at the municipal and state level. Sometimes approv-
als can take three years.
76. Section 20 of the Fair Housing Act requires New Jersey's Neighborhood Preser-
vation Program to establish a revolving fund from which grants or loans are awarded to
municipalities whose housing elements have received COAH certification or who are sub-
ject to the builder's remedy, and to receiving municipalities in cases where COAH has
approved a RCA and project plan developed by the receiving municipality. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 52:27D-320.
77. See Martha Lamar, Allan Mallach & John M. Payne, Mount Laurel at Work:
Affordable Housing in New Jersey, 1983-1988, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 1197, 1209 (1989).
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Now, part of the Mount Laurel mandate was to fast track develop-
ments, and that's something that the Council has been weak on.
When you have a small staff and you're trying to monitor the whole
State, it's very difficult to know what's going on in each community,
so if there are delays going on, it's hard to respond to it. The only
way we find out in many cases is if a developer complains. Develop-
ers are reluctant to complain because they risk creating an adversarial
relationship with the municipality and delay the approval process
even further. So it's a difficult problem to address, but we're working
on it.
PROFESSOR FRANZESE: I'd like to introduce Mr. Steve Eis-
dorfer. Mr. Eisdorfer is a member of the Public Advocate's Office.
He is Deputy Public Advocate for the State of New Jersey.
MR. EISDORFER: I'd like to address a question to Mr. Van
Doren. As counsel for the Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P.,
I was a little bit surprised at your characterization of what the pur-
poses of the Mount Laurel doctrine are because you didn't talk about
the issue that most strongly motivated the original plaintiffs, which is
the issue of racial integration.
New Jersey is one of the most racially segregated states in the coun-
try in terms of residences and it seemed to the plaintiffs in the original
Mount Laurel case that exclusionary zoning was an instrument of ra-
cial segregation. Indeed, when I talk to municipalities, they always
ask me three questions in sequence. They always say first, "Why us?"
And second they say, "Can we restrict it [our fair share of affordable
housing units] just to our own residents?" And third, "Can it be only
senior citizen housing?" And those things all have in common that it
should be "us" and not other people, "us" and not "them," and we
know who "them" are, and I guess the question I have for you is how
does your analysis deal with the problem of race if indeed achieving
racial integration or at least undoing the consequences of legally en-
forced racial segregation is an important consideration? In other
words, how, from a market economics point of view, would one deal
with that?
PROFESSOR VAN DOREN: I think it's very important that in the
initial allocation of zoning rights, we probably ought to give them to
the very poor citizens in the first place which, in our society, at least
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until recently, consisted of rural whites and more urban blacks.78
Then they would get to decide whether or not they would want to sell
those rights to more affluent people to allow the affluent to segregate
themselves or whether they'd exercise those rights and, in fact, gain
entrance to the community in question. I'd let people decide whether
or not they want to buy and sell these rights.
MR. PHILLIP DUFFY: Mr. Bernard, I guess this is most appro-
priately addressed to you. With regard to the regional contribution
agreements that were discussed earlier in the program, how many of
the rich communities or upper-income communities have already sold
off their Mount Laurel obligations and what would you attribute that
to? As Professor Van Doren suggests, the reason probably is the up-
per-income areas not wanting low-income families in their
communities.
MR. BERNARD: Well, I think that's one of the reasons and I
don't want to minimize that reason. I think in some communities
they legitimately feel that accepting too much growth in that area
would be poor planning and that it would be better planning to create
the housing in areas that already have an infrastructure.
Entering into a regional contribution agreement is not that easy to
do. The average price to transfer units is about $20,000 per unit, so
it's sometimes difficult for communities to come up with the money.
Of the two hundred communities that have achieved either substan-
tive certification or a court settlement, I would say that less than 30
municipalities have participated in these regional contribution
agreements.
PROFESSOR FRANZESE: That question was posed by Mr. Phil
Duffy, who is a third year law student at Seton Hall. Professor
Michael Ambrosio, who is about to speak, is a member of the Afford-
able Housing Colloquium.
PROFESSOR MICHAEL AMBROSIO: This is for either Mr. Ber-
nard or Mr. Van Doren. Wouldn't that be a burden on property val-
ues and thereby put a greater burden on the middle class to take care
of this problem of providing affordable housing for the poor and
would it be fair for the rich neighborhoods where there is more ability
to absorb any regress, if there is any, in property values?
78. See Isabel V. Sawhill, Poverty in the U.S.: Why is it so Persistent?, 26 J. EcON.
LIT. 1073 (1988).
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MR. BERNARD: Can I start first? I think we have to remember a
couple of things here. The housing market had gotten to the point in
New Jersey such that housing wasn't a problem just for low and mod-
erate-income people. It was a problem for most people in New Jersey.
Also, keep in mind that many of the low-income units have been built
as part of an inclusionary development where there are up to four
market units that are helping to support each low and moderate-in-
come unit. The market units are, in general, more affordable than
most of the housing stock in the community. Therefore, for each
lower-income unit built, the development community is delivering up
to four market units that are often affordable to the middle class. Be-
cause of this, it has been said that the people benefitting from the
Mount Laurel decisions are not lower-income people but the middle
class.
MS. SHARI WEINER: My name is Shari Weiner. I'm a first year
law student here. I want to talk about the Council. I was mayor of a
community in New Jersey during the time that we were approving
our Mount Laurel plan.
This community was very well-planned. We had reached the maxi-
mum population that our targeted infrastructure could support. I, as
an elected official, felt the responsibility to uphold Mount Laurel and
try to do that against the cries and wishes of the senior citizens in the
town.
I'd like a justification for how I, as an elected official, and other
elected officials, can address citizens when they see what is happening
to the community. Why should the State be able to come in and tell
us now that we have finished, in our minds, with our community
planning, that we have to figure out some way to put in thousands of
additional units, whether or not it is the number we had come up
with, with the builder's remedy? There was just no way that the town
would not suffer in order to fulfill the constitutional mandate that was
handed to us.
PROFESSOR VAN DOREN: First of all, I'm fond of telling my
students that the notion that suburbs are full strikes me as an odd idea
when Hong Kong has a density of 360,000 people per square mile.
New Jersey is nowhere near that density. The question is not are we
full or not. The question is who has property rights? We can do two
things with property rights; we can try to distribute them through
majority rule, or we can distribute them by trading and I guess all I'm
suggesting is that there's a strong argument that suburbs should never
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have had those property rights free in the first place. I'm not focusing
on whether or not any people actually ever end up in suburbs, and I
don't really care actually.
What I care about is that they have property rights and that they be
able to sell them or buy them as they wish and the wealth distribution,
in my view of the world, would be very different and it would save
your infrastructure. You never have to actually have the people come
there and that's fine with me. That's a very market-oriented solution
and it's redistributive at the same time.
MR. BERNARD: There are several answers to your question. One
is that the supreme court made it clear that the town has to do this
[provide its share of affordable housing] and once we get beyond that
bare fact, then we have to think of answers that our electorate can
deal with.
I suppose one of the things that we're thinking about is that the
[Fair Housing] Act really doesn't create a downside for not address-
ing the need. If you don't address the need, you might wind up in
court and a judge is going to make you do something, but as a politi-
cian, at least you can blame the judge. If you come forward and do
the right thing, then everybody is going to blame you. Regardless, the
Council is considering incentives for communities to address the need.
The rationale for this is to allow local politicians to go to the electo-
rate and explain why their community should attempt to meet their
affordable housing obligation.
PROFESSOR FRANZESE: I'm told that we need to conclude the
formal portion of this evening's program and that once we break,
we'll reassemble a bit more informally for the purposes of some more
exchange. Let me close, with your permission, with a very brief para-
ble that I was thinking a lot about in preparing for this meeting.
There is an elder in a given town and this elder has seen a lot, she's
endured a lot, and she knows a lot. In this same town live a group of
rather bold and brazen young boys. One day, the ringleader of these
boys tells his friend, "You know that old lady? She thinks she knows
so much. Well, I'm going to ask her a question that she can't possibly
know the answer to. You see this dove in my hand? I'm going to ask
her, 'Old lady, is this dove alive or is it dead?' As she thinks about it,
I'll put the dove behind my back. If she says it's dead, I'll simply
release my hand and let the bird fly free. And if she tells me that the
dove is alive, I'll simply break its neck and show her that it's dead.
Either way, she'll be wrong."
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The youth, now all fired up, finds the town elder and says to her,
"This bird that I hold in my hands, is it alive or is it dead?" The elder
looks up and says, "Young man, it's in your hands." Ladies and gen-
tlemen, it's in all of our hands.
As we continue to explore the legacy and the future of the Mount
Laurel mandate, I hope that we find the strength and the wisdom to
ask the right questions. I'd like to thank our panelists for their partic-
ipation in this first of our series of exchanges, and I'd also like to
thank all of you for making this possible by your presence and
support.
